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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20060218-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court should have granted Baker's motion to suppress evidence 
illegally obtained when the officers unlawfully detained and searched Baker without any 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity? Under State v. Brake, 2004 UT 
95, [^15, 103 P.3d 699, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts. 
Lay ton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, fll. This issue was preserved by Baker's 
Motion to Suppress, his Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress, and his conditional Sery plea agreement (R. 37-41, 105-16). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
All other controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Luke Zachary Baker appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fourth District Court after entering a conditional plea to illegal possession of a 
controlled substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, and possession of 
drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a Class A misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Luke Zachary Baker was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court on or about October 7, 2004, with possession or use of 
methamphetamine in a drug free zone, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i); and unlawful possession or use of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37a-5a (R. 1). 
A preliminary hearing was held on November 24, 2004, and Baker was bound 
over for trial (R. 34, 149). 
On December 13, 2004, Baker filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting that he was 
illegally searched and seized, violating his rights pursuant to Article I, §14 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (R. 37-40). 
Oral arguments on Baker's motion to suppress were scheduled for January 19, 
2005 (R. 52, 53-54). On January 19, 2005, the hearing was continued for oral 
arguments on the motion to February 9, 2005 (R. 62-63). On February 9, 2005, 
instead of entertaining just oral arguments, the trial court allowed the State to proceed 
with an unscheduled suppression hearing (R. 67, 150). At the unscheduled suppression 
hearing, the trial court stated it would take the matter under advisement and issue a 
written ruling (R. 150: 36). 
Two days later, on February 11, 2005, the trial court denied Baker's motion (R. 
68-74). Because Baker did not have an opportunity to respond in writing to the 
unscheduled suppression hearing, Baker submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress on February 17, 2005, asserting that Baker 
was illegally detained as a matter of law (R. 77-80). 
On January 4, 2006, Baker entered into a conditional "Sery" plea agreement, 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to possession of a controlled 
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substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, and to possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor (R. 103-04, 105-12, 113-16). 
On February 22, 2006, Baker was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State prison, prison term suspended, 
for the second degree felony (R. 120). Baker was also sentenced to one year jail, jail 
term suspended, for the misdemeanor (R. 120). Baker was ultimately sentenced to a 
term of 90 days in the Utah County jail (R. 120). 
On March 6, 2006, Baker timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment, 
sentence, and commitment in this case in the Fourth District Court (R. 124). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Preliminary Hearing 
Detective Raymond Robertson was the sole witness at the preliminary hearing 
(R. 149). On September 30, 2004, Robertson pulled a vehicle over for no plate light 
(R. 149: 5). Apparently, there were at least three officers on the scene (R. 149: 6). 
Robertson discovered that the driver had a suspended license, so he arrested her and 
then "immediately" called for a K-9 unit to come and search the car (R. 149: 5,11, 
12). Robertson testified that the only reason he had the K-9 unit come and search the 
car was because the driver had a suspended license (R. 149: 11). The K-9 unit arrived 
approximately 12 minutes after Robertson arrested the driver (R. 149: 12, 18). 
When Robertson first approached the vehicle and well before the K-9 unit 
arrived, Robertson observed in plain view a knife on the center occupant in the center 
backseat (R. 149: 13). Apparently, the vehicle occupants were asked about knives, and 
they handed over 13 knives to the officers while the occupants remained in the car (R. 
149: 13, 14, 21). At this point, the officers left the individuals in the car (R. 149: 21). 
Robertson was unsure whether Baker handed over a knife while in the vehicle (R. 149: 
14). 
When the K-9 unit arrived, the drug dog indicated somewhere on the exterior of 
the vehicle (R. 149: 12). At that point, each individual occupant was taken out of the 
vehicle and searched one by one (R. 149: 6, 20-21). Robertson testified that they 
originally confiscated the knives for officer safety reasons; however, the individuals 
were searched not because of officer safety, but because the drug dog indicated on the 
exterior of the vehicle (R. 149: 1243, 21). Robertson admitted that he had no officer 
safety concerns when the individuals were pulled out of the car one by one (R. 149: 
21). 
Baker was taken out of the vehicle and searched (R. 149: 6). Found in his left-
front pocket pants was a glass pipe, to which Robertson testified was commonly used 
for smoking marijuana (R. 149: 7). Found in Baker's shoe was a glass pipe for 
smoking methamphetamme (R. 149: 8). Baker was arrested and transported to the 
police station, whereupon a further search revealed a small baggie of methamphetamme 
(R. 149: 7). 
Robertson admitted that he did not tell Baker or anyone else in the vehicle that 
they were free to leave (R. 149: 12, 15). In fact, Robertson testified that Baker was not 
free to leave after he called for the K-9 unit (R. 149: 15). Robertson further testified 
that he would not have found illegal items on Baker if Baker had not been searched (R. 
149: 16). 
Unscheduled Suppression Hearing 
Testimony of Art Lopez 
Art Lopez is a police officer for Orem City (R. 150: 5). Lopez is a certified K-9 
handler (R. 150: 5). When Lopez arrived on the scene, there were four people in the 
car, and the driver was not in the car (R. 150: 5). There were already three other 
officers on the scene (R. 150: 5). 
Lopez had his drug dog search the vehicle, and the dog first indicated on the 
outside trunk of the vehicle and then indicated on the driver's side by scratching (R. 
150: 6). Lopez then continued to search the exterior of the vehicle and went all the 
way around the vehicle (R. 150: 6). The dog again indicated on the trunk of the 
vehicle and then indicated on the driver's rear passenger handle of the vehicle (R. 150: 
6). 
Lopez observed knives on the hood of the patrol car, but he did not see any 
knives removed from the vehicle (R. 150: 7). Lopez also observed the four passengers 
removed from the vehicle (R. 150: 7). Lopez then had the dog search the interior of 
the vehicle, but there were no hits or indications (R. 150: 7). 
Testimony of Mike Bartell 
Mike Bartell is a police officer for Pleasant Grove (R. 150: 8). Bartell assisted 
Officer Robertson on September 30, 2004 (R. 150: 9). When Bartell arrived on the 
scene, Robertson already had the driver out of the vehicle (R. 150: 9). Bartell went to 
the vehicle and made contact with the other four passengers (R. 150: 9). One of the 
rear passengers wanted Bartell to know that he was in possession of a knife, and 
voluntarily told Bartell he had a knife and also showed Bartell the knife (R. 150: 9, 11). 
Bartell was unsure whether Baker was the individual that handed him the knife (R. 150: 
11). 
Bartell asked to take the knife until they were finished with the stop and then he 
asked if there were anymore knives in the vehicle (R. 150: 9). Bartell testified that 
"Everybody started handing me knives" (R. 150: 9). Bartell further testified that 
everyone, including Baker, handed him at least one knife (R. 150: 10-12). Most of the 
knives were small pocket knives, about 3 to 4 inches (R. 150: 12). There was also a 
set of "throwing knives", but Bartell described them as small and did not say any of 
them were over 4 inches in length (R. 150: 12-13). 
Bartell admitted that he was unaware that anyone had possession of a knife until 
the individual in the back seat told him (R. 150: 13). Bartell further stated that no one 
threatened him or no one did anything that made him fear for his safety (R. 150: 13). 
Testimony of Chris Rockwood 
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Chris Rockwood is a police officer for the Orem City (R. 150: 14). Rockwood 
assisted with the traffic stop on September 30, 2004, arriving five to eight minutes after 
the initial stop occurred (R. 150: 15, 19). When Rockwood arrived, Bartell was 
already retrieving the knives from the occupants in the vehicle (R. 150: 15, 19). 
Robertson told Rockwood to search the occupants of the vehicle because the K-9 
unit indicated on the exterior of the vehicle (R. 150: 19-20). In fact, Rockwood 
testified that Robertson was the "lead guy" on the scene and he was only a "back-up 
officer" and he searched under Robertson's direction (R. 150: 20). Rockwood had 
Baker exit the vehicle and he searched him (R. 150: 16). Baker was one of three 
passengers in the back seat (R. 150: 17). Rockwood patted down Baker and found a 
pipe in his front pants pocket (R. 150: 17). 
Rockwood testified that he saw more than five knives when he glanced on the 
hood of the patrol car, and "they ranged from pocket knives up to large knives", being 
5 or 6 inches long (R. 150: 21). Rockwood knew that the knives were voluntarily 
handed over and that none of the passengers threatened him at any time (R. 150: 21). 
Rockwood further acknowledged that was unaware whether any of the occupants were 
violent (R. 150:21). 
When asked whether he was concerned for officer safety during the stop, 
Rockwood answered that he is always concerned for officer safety during a stop (R. 
150: 22). When asked specifically if there was anything about this particular stop and 
about these particular passengers, whether they said or did anything that made him fear 
for his safety, Rockwood testified "no" (R. 150: 22-23). 
Testimony of Raymond Robertson 
Raymond Robertson testified that he previously testified at the preliminary 
hearing on this matter, and that he initiated the stop on September 30, 2004 (R. 150: 
24). Robertson testified that there were 5 people in the vehicle when he stopped it (R. 
150: 25). 
As he initially approached the vehicle, he used his flashlight to survey the 
passengers before his approached the driver (R. 150: 25). After speaking with the 
driver, he ran a warrants check on her, discovered she had a suspended driver's 
license, and then he immediately asked dispatch to send a K-9 unit (R. 150: 25). 
Robertson said he requested the K-9 unit at 12:21 and that it arrived at 1:34 a.m. (R. 
150: 26).l 
Robertson then placed the driver under arrest (R. 150: 26). After Bartell 
arrived, Robertson told him about a knife he saw in plain view (R. 150: 26). 
Robertson testified that his report states a total of 13 knives were taken from the 
passengers in the vehicle (R. 150: 27-28). When asked whether he said anything to 
Rockwood about searching the car occupants, Robertson testified "I don't remember 
specifically anything. I think we discussed the amount of knives that were found while 
we were waiting for K-9" (R. 150: 28). 
1
 Robertson previously testified that the K-9 unit arrived at 12:34 a.m. (R. 149- 12, 18). 
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Robertson admitted again that he searched Baker because the drug dog indicated 
on the exterior of the vehicle and that he had no reason in particular, other than the 
general officer safety accompanying every stop, to fear for his safety when Baker was 
taken out of the car and searched (R. 150: 30-32). Robertson admitted die search of 
Baker was solely for contraband (R. 150: 32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Baker asserts that he was unlawfully detained in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights when the officers, pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, arrested the 
driver for driving on a suspended license, and then, instead of letting him go, 
confiscated his personal possessions] and had him and the other passengers wait in the 
vehicle until a K-9 unit arrived and searched the exterior of the vehicle. Baker asserts 
that there were no specific articulable facts that he was engaged in or about to be 
engaged in any criminal activity to support the detention and the resulting search of his 
person exceeded the express scope of the stop, resulting in an unreasonable search and 
seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. 
Moreover, the trial court misconstrued the facts in finding that the officers were 
reasonably concerned for their safety since there was no evidence presented, especially 
by the officers, that the officers were particularly concerned for their safety during the 
traffic stop. Importantly, not one officer testified that they believed Baker or any of the 
other passengers in the vehicle were armed or dangerous. Furthermore, not one officer 
testified that when Baker was searched, they believed they were going to find weapons. 
In fact, the officers testified that Baker was searched only after the drug dog alerted on 
the exterior of the vehicle and he was searched for the express purpose of finding drugs 
on his person. 
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was in error and 
Baker asks this Court to remand this case with instructions that the plea is to be 
withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING BAKER'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Baker asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that officer safety justified 
Baker's detention and that the automobile exception justified the warrantless search of 
Baker. Despite the trial court's erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
Baker was illegally detained as a matter of law once, the officers confiscated personal 
possession(s) and had him wait in the vehicle until a K-9 unit arrived to search the 
vehicle without reasonable, articulable suspicion that Baker had committed a crime. 
Accordingly, the illegal detention and subsequent search of Baker's person violated his 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"When a case involves the reasonableness of a search and seizure, 'we afford 
little discretion to the district court because there must be state-wide standards that 
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guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials.'" State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 
19, 107 P.3d 706 (citations omitted). Under State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 115, 103 P.3d 
699, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness, without 
deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts. See Lay ton City v. 
Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, f 11. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. There is no question that 
"stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Layton City, 2006 UT App 244 at 113 (quoting 
State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, 111, 68P.3d 1043). "The Constitution does not 
forbid all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). Because there were no reasonable, articulable facts that Baker 
was engaged in criminal activity, his prolonged detention violated his Federal 
Constitutional rights. 
A. Baker was illegally detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
1132 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). And "once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to 
proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional 
questioning/" 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 
App. 1990). Any "investigative questioning that further detains the driver must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity/' Id. "Reasonable 
suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of 
the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Id. 
In State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, the defendant was a back seat passenger in 
a vehicle lawfully stopped for following too closely to another vehicle. Id. at %L. Upon 
approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed the smell of tobacco coming from the 
vehicle, observed cigarettes on the dashboard, and believed that the passengers looked 
to young to possess tobacco. Id. at f3. The officer asked the occupants if they had been 
smoking and they admitted they had. Id. The officer then asked the occupants to 
produce identification, to which the defendant produced identification showing he was 
19. Id. at f4. Althou^i the identification card did not appear to be altered, the officer 
took the identification card and ran a warrants check to make sure it was accurate and 
not false. Id. The officer also testified that it is his standard procedure to take occupants 
identification and verify it with a computer check. Id. The warrants check revealed an 
outstanding warrant for the defendant, who was then arrested and searched, which 
search revealed controlled substances. Id. at *$. 
Defendant asserted that he was illegally detained and searched, but the trial court 
denied the motion to suppress, finding sufficient articulable facts to support the officer's 
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belief that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity and thus sufficient facts to 
support the detention. Chism, 2005 UT App 41 at %. 
On appeal, this Court held that "[n]o person may be detained except upon 
reasonable suspicion, and the scope of the detention must be limited to addressing the 
articulated grounds for the stop." Chism, 2005 UT App 41 at 1fl5. This Court further 
stated that "[i]nvestigative acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving 
the articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do 'not add to the delay 
already lawfully experienced' and do 'not represent any further intrusion on [the 
detainee's] rights."' Id. (quoting People v. McGaughran, 601 P.2d 207, 211 (Cal. 
1979), cited with approval inLopez, 873 P.2d at 1133). Additionally, "[assuming that 
reasonable suspicion supporting a detention initially exists, the detention must cease at 
the point where the suspicion becomes unreasonable." Id. (citation omitted). 
Ultimately, this Court held in Chism that while a computer check on the driver is 
justified as long as the initial stop is justified, any further detention of the passengers is 
unlawful where there is no continuing reasonable suspicion that the passengers are 
engaged in criminal activity. Chism, 2005 UT App 41 at f s l5 , 21-22. 
In this case, the vehicle was stopped for a faulty license plate light (R. 149: 5). 
Officer Robertson, including the other officers at the scene, made no statements 
indicating that anyone in the vehicle had been or was about to be engaged in criminal 
activity, except that the driver had a faulty plate light (R. 149, 150). After Officer 
Robertson ran a warrants check on the driver, he learned that her license was 
suspended so he arrested her (R. 149: 5; 150: 25). Officer Robertson also immediately 
requested that a K-9 unit come and search the vehicle (R. 149: 12). Although it is not 
entirely clear from the record, it appears that Officer Bartell was the first officer to 
arrive and help Officer Robertson (R. 150: 9, 15, 26). Once Officer Bartell arrived, 
the driver was already out of the car and possibly arrested (R. 150: 9, 26). Shortly 
thereafter, Officer Rockwood arrived on the scene (R. 150: 15, 19). Although a knife 
was observed in the vehicle on one of the four passengers and 13 knives were 
confiscated from the passengers while they still remained in the vehicle, not one officer 
expressed any concerns for officer safety, other than the general concerns associated 
with each and every stop (R. 149: 13, 14, 21; 150: 13, 21, 22-23, 32). 
Baker does not dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid and that the driver 
was legally arrested. However, Baker asserts that he was illegally detained against his 
will when Officer Robertson called for a K-9 unit and had them wait until the K-9 unit 
arrived and searched the exterior of the vehicle and then searched each occupant one by 
one (R. 149: 5, 11, 12, 20-21). Moreover, Baker was illegally detained once his 
pocket knife was confiscated, well before the K-9 unit arrived and while he was still 
detained in the vehicle (R. 150: 10-12). Baker further asserts that there was no 
reasonable, articulable evidence that Baker or any of the other passengers had 
committed a crime. 
None of the officers offered any explanation as to why the K-9 search was 
necessary and none of the officers pointed to any reasonable, articulable evidence as to 
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why the vehicle should be searched by the K-9 unit (R. 149, 150). Although the trial 
court relied on Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), in finding that the canine 
search was valid since it was done pursuant to a lawful traffic stop (R. 72-73), the facts 
of Caballes are very different from the facts here. In fact, Caballes only lends support 
to Baker's position. 
In Caballes, an officer stopped the defendant, the sole occupant of the car, for 
speeding. 543 U.S. at 406. A second officer heard over dispatch about the stop, and he 
brought his narcotics-detection dog to the scene and searched the vehicle while the 
other officer was writing the defendant a ticket, even though there was no articulable 
suspicion to justify using the dog. Id. at 406, 407. The dog alerted on the trunk and the 
officers searched the trunk finding marijuana and then arrested the defendant. Id. The 
entire incident lasted less than 10 minutes. Id. 
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the initial stop was based on probable cause 
and lawful. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. The Court further found that during this stop, 
although there was no reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in further 
criminal activity, the canine search did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights. Id. The Court held that "the use of a well trained narcotics-detection dog 
...during a lawful traf fie stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy 
interests." Id. at 409. 
Although the question before the Court in Caballes was "[w]hether the Fourth 
Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection 
dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop," 545 U.S. at 407, it is clear from 
the language the Court used that had the defendant been detained after the express 
scope and purpose of the stop had ended, a further detention to have the dog search the 
exterior of the vehicle would violate the Fourth Amendment. For example, the Court 
stated that a lawfal traffic stop seizure can violate the Fourth Amendment "if its manner 
of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Id. The 
Court further reiterated that a traffic stop seizure "can become unlawful if it is 
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Id. Finally, 
the Court held that "[w]e may assume that a similar result [unconstitutional seizure] 
would be warranted in this case if the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent 
was being unlawfully detained." Id. 
Accordingly, the trial court's reliance on Caballes in misplaced. Baker does not 
dispute that the driver was validly arrested. However, the officers had no right to 
detain Baker or any of the other passengers once the initial purposes of the stop ended. 
See Chism, 2005 UT App 41 at [^12. The officers could not muster any reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Baker was engaged in criminal activity. Although one 
passenger had a knife in plain view, the officers could not remember which passenger 
possessed that knife (R. 149: 13, 14; 150: 11). Moreover, no officer suggested that 
they had any reason to believe that Baker was about to commit a crime (R. 149, 150). 
Although Baker was in possession of a pocket knife, he handed that over to Officer 
Bartell as soon as it was requested (R. 150: 10-12). There certainly was no indication 
and no evidence was presented that Baker, nor any of the other passengers, could 
possess the knives in question (R. 149, 150). 
The evidence clearly shows that Baker was detained. Officer Robertson testified 
at the preliminary hearing that the passengers were not free to leave while the K-9 was 
en route (R. 140: 15). He also testified that while they were in the car and the K-9 was 
on its way, he did not tell the passengers that they were free to leave (R. 149: 12). 
None of the other officers told the passengers that they were free to leave (R. 150). 
Furthermore, three officers were present while Baker was detained, until the K-9 unit 
arrived, providing a fourth officer plus a dog, all the while the passengers remained in 
the vehicle (R. 150: 5). All of these circumstances provide evidence which shows 
Baker believed he was not free to leave. 
Although the trial court attempted to bolster its conclusion that Baker was not 
detained by citing to the fact that the officers never told Baker he was not free to leave 
(R. 72), such is not the proper basis for the determination of whether a person has been 
detained. The proper question is whether a reasonable person in defendant's shoes 
believes he is not free to leave. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT , t 39, 63 P.3d 650; 
State v. Gronau, 2001 UT App 245, 1f 10, 31 P3d 601. Under these facts, considering 
that there were four officers and one drug dog, that the officers already confiscated 
personal possession(s) from Baker, and that no officer informed Baker that he was free 
to leave, no reasonable person in Baker's position would believe he was free to leave. 
More importantly, and also dispositive of the detention question, is the fact that 
the officers confiscated personal property from Baker while he was in the vehicle (R. 
150: 1042). Once an officer takes items of personal property from a vehicle occupant, 
the encounter is deemed a non-consensual detention, at least until such items are 
returned. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(overruled on other grounds by United States v. Flowers, 441 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 
2006)). It can not be reasonably asserted that Baker thought he was free to leave after 
the officers confiscated his personal property. Accordingly, the trial court's finding 
otherwise is wrong. 
B. The trial court erroneously found that the officers were justified in 
detaining and searching Baker for officer safety reasons. 
In denying the motion to suppress, Baker asserts that the trial court misstated the 
clear and indisputable facts, ignored the officers' straightforward testimony regarding 
officer safety, and misapplied the law. 
The "Terry" frisk exception does not apply to the facts of this case. While 
Baker is aware of the risks officers face each day in conducting traffic stops, no such 
concerns were present to justify the warrantless search of Baker. See Brake, 2004 UT 
95, at fs 23-25, . The Utah Supreme Court held in Brake that "[o]fficer safety 
concerns that satisfy the requirements for a warrantless search are more exacting than 
the safety risks inherent in every traffic encounter." Id. at f26. Before an officer can 
conduct a warrantless search for weapons, the officer "must reasonably believe[] that 
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the suspect is dangerous, and that he may obtain immediate control of weapons." Id. 
Such facts are simply not present in this case. 
The trial court held that officer safety justified the warrantless search of Baker 
due to the "sheer number" of knives that the passengers of the vehicle turned over to 
the police, the fact that it was 1:30 a.m., that there were five occupants, that the driver 
had been arrested, and that a police-trained drug detection canine alerted on the exterior 
trunk and rear door of the vehicle (R. 70). In light of these facts, the trial court held 
"frankly, it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably believed that the 
Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous" (R. 70). Such a 
finding is utterly against the plain and straightforward testimony of the officers. 
Although 13 knives were confiscated before the K-9 unit arrived, all passengers 
remained in the vehicle until after the drug dog indicated on the exterior of the vehicle 
(R. 149: 6, 13, 14, 20-21). In light of this fact, Officer Robertson was asked at the 
preliminary hearing his reason for searching Baker (R. 149: 12). Officer Robertson 
testified that the only reason he searched Baker because "the dog had indicated on the 
vehicle" (R. 149: 12). Officer Robertson then changed course, and stated that he also 
searched Baker "Because of the known knife issue. We had several knives that were in 
plain view when we walked up to the vehicle" (R. 149: 13). Officer Robertson then 
stated that he also searched Baker because "it's a safety issue" (R. 149: 13). However, 
Officer Robertson later admitted that there were no officer safety issues once the drug 
dog searched the vehicle since all the knives were already confiscated at that point (R. 
149: 21). 
When Officer Lopez arrived with the drug dog, although he observed knives on 
the hood of the patrol car, he expressed no concerns for his own or other officers' 
safety due to the passengers in the vehicle (R. 150: 5-6, 7). He did, however, check 
the exterior of the vehicle to make sure that nothing such as glass metal, or emissions 
would harm the drug dog (R. 150: 6). 
When Officer Bartell arrived on the scene, he made contact with the passengers 
and one passenger told Officer Bartell that he had in his possession a knife and he 
showed the knife to Officer Bartell (R. 150: 9, 11). Officer Bartell expressed no 
particularized concerns for his safety when he asked the passengers to hand over any 
knives on them (R. 150: 9). In fact, Officer Bartell testified that none of the passengers 
did anything that made him concerned for his safety (R. 150: 13). 
When Officer Rockwood arrived on the scene, he saw that Officer Bartell was 
confiscating knives from the passengers in the car (R. 150: 15, 19). Although Officer 
Rockwood first stated that he searched the passengers because of the knives (R. 150: 
19), he clarified his testimony and explained that he searched the passengers because 
Officer Robertson, the lead officer on the scene, told him to (R. 150: 19-20). Officer 
Rockwood also testified that the reason he searched the passengers is because the drug 
dog indicated on the exterior of the vehicle (R. 150: 20). Officer Rockwood further 
admitted that the only concerns he had for his safety were general concerns associated 
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with every traffic stop (R. 150: 22). However, Officer Rockwood testified that during 
this specific stop, there was nothing any of the passengers did that made him concerned 
for his safety (R. 150: 22-23). 
Officer Robertson again testified that the 13 knives were taken out of the vehicle 
before the K-9 unit arrived (R. 150: 27-28). When asked if he said anything to Officer 
Rockwood about his "concerns in relation to the vehicle," Officer Robertson 
responded, "I don't remember specifically anything. I think we discussed the amount 
of knives that were found while we were waiting for the K-9" (R. 150: 28). However, 
when specifically asked whether the decision to search Baker was due to officer safety, 
Officer Robertson testified that he was not searched for safety reasons (R. 150: 31). 
Notably, Officer Robertson, as well as the other officers originally on the scene, 
were each given the opportunity to discuss any concerns they may have had regarding 
their personal safety as a pretext to search the passengers, and not one of them testified 
that they had any particular concerns for their safety (R. 150: 9, 13, 22-23, 29-31). 
Moreover, not one officer testified that he believed Baker or any other passenger was 
armed and dangerous (R. 149, 150). In fact, the officers testified that the passengers 
were searched because the drug dog indicated on the exterior of the vehicle (R. 149, 
150). Despite these facts, the trial court found that the officers "reasonably believed 
that the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous" and that the 
search was a "Terry" frisk for weapons (R. 69-71). 
Baker does not dispute that the first three officers had reasonable belief to think 
at least one of the passengers carried a knife since the passenger willingly informed and 
showed the officers that he possessed such an item (R. 150: 9, 11). However, this fact 
does not justify the prolonged detention and warrantless search of Baker. After seeing 
the knife, the officer chose to ask the occupants of the vehicle for any weapons they had 
instead of taking them out of the vehicle and searching them right then and there (R. 
150: 9). The passengers handed over the knives (R. 150: 9-12). If the officers had any 
further belief that the passengers were "armed and dangerous," they certainly would 
have done more than have the passengers sit in the vehicle, considering that it was dark 
outside and they would unlikely be able to see any movements inside the vehicle (R. 
150: 26). If the officers were truly concerned for their safety, which none of them 
testified that they were, yet the trial court ostensibly found that they were, they 
certainly would not have just allowed the passengers to sit in the dark vehicle; rather, it 
is likely that they would have called for additional back-up, ordered the passengers out 
of the car to frisk them, or at least ordered everyone to keep their hands were they 
could be seen. Notably, the officers took no such action. 
Moreover, if the officers were conducting a "Terry" frisk for weapons, they 
would have said so. Notably, the officers each admitted that the search took place only 
after the drug dog indicated that he had found drugs (R. 149: 12-13, 21; 150:19-20, 30-
32). Furthermore, Officer Robertson testified specifically that the search on Baker was 
done to find drugs, not weapons (R. 150: 30-31). Accordingly, the trial court's finding 
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that the search was a "Terry" frisk for weapons is simply unfounded since there is no 
evidence that the passengers, including Baker, were dangerous and that any further 
search would produce weapons. 
C. The Exclusionary Rule Demands Suppression of All Evidence 
Discovered as a Result of the Illegal Detention. 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that illegally obtained evidence 
is inadmissible through operation of the exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 398, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Further, the Utah Supreme Court 
has upheld the application of that rule with reference to the federal and state 
constitution making all evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure to be 
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 
1990). 
Because the detention in this case was conducted in violation of Baker's right to 
be free from such searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule should bar the admission 
of all evidence found as a result of that search. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Baker asks that this Court to reverse the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. Baker further asks that this matter be remanded to the 
Fourth District Court with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn, that all 
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure be suppressed, and that 
the matter is to be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 2006. 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 041403985 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained 
by the State of Utah in the instant case. The Court having carefully considered the Motions and 
Memoranda and in response to counsels5 request for a decision based solely on the pleadings, now 
makes the following Ruling and Order. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. The Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on 
December 13, 2004. 
2. The State filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on December 27, 2004. 
3. The Defendant filed its Reply to the State's Response on January 10, 2005. 
4. On February 9,2005, the Court held a Suppression Hearing, where testimony was presented 
and oral arguments were made. The Court then took the matter under advisement. 
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II. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
The facts relied on herein were adduced from testimony at both the preliminary hearing and 
the suppression hearing. 
III. 
ANALYSIS & RULING 
1. Initial Detention 
First of all, police officers have considerable discretion to protect officer safety, including 
having passengers exit a vehicle while the traffic stop is being conducted. Maryland v. Wilson. 519 
U.S. 408,415(1997). This can logically be extended to permitting officers to have passengers remain 
inside the vehicle during the stop. However, the litmus test for whether an individual has been 
detained "depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer 
thinks the person is no longer free to leave." State v. Patefiekl 927 P.2d 655,659 (Utah App. 1996) 
(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, "the subjective intention of the [officer] is irrelevant except insofar as they may 
have been conveyed to the [defendant]." U.S. v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544. 554 n.6 (1980). Such 
a detention occurs when an "officer engages in conduct which a reasonable person would view as 
threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen." Salt Lake City v. Rav. 998 
P.2d 274, 278 (Utah App. 2000). Hence, it is an objective test that balances the totality of the 
circumstances that the alleged detainee is faced with. Finally, a canine sniff conducted during a 
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that 
no individual has any right to possess, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes. 
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543 U.S. (2005) (Slip Opinion). 
Although the time line of this traffic stop is somewhat blurry, it appears that the stop was 
initiated very early in the morning on September 30, 2004, that the K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m., 
that the K-9 arrived at 1:34 a.m., and the Defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m. The 
request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the driver's license had been suspended for 
drugs. Notably, the Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time length of 
the stop or in connection with the K-9 request, etc. 
The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in the police car; the significance 
of the K-9 is discussed infra. In sum, it was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five 
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers were dealing with the driver and her 
arrest until the K-9 arrived. Furthermore, the officers never told the Defendant that he was not free 
to leave, although he testified that he subjectively believed that (which is irrelevant). Under these 
circumstances, the Defendant was not "detained" for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections to 
be triggered. 
2. Canine Sniff 
A positive alert by a police-trained drug-detecting canine "is sufficient to establish probable 
cause" to search. U.S. v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). The only exception to this general 
rule seems to be if the dog has a poor accuracy record with a history of false alerts. U.S. v. Ludwig, 
10 F.3d 1523, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1993). Officers with probable cause may conduct a warrantless 
search of the passenger compartment of a car, including its occupants, pursuant to the automobile 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); U.S. v. Barbee, 968 
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F.2d 1026,1030 (10th Cir. 1992). 
In this case, the facts are undisputed that the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13 
minutes after it was called, alerted to the exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in. 
Ironically, Defense Counsel argued at the Suppression Hearing that the canine sniff is legally 
insufficient to establishing probable cause. This flies in the face of the aforementioned well-
established case law, which holds the contrary position. Because the case law is clear and because 
the Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record, the Court finds that the Defendant 
was properly searched incident to the probable cause derived from the positive canine alert. 
3. Terry Frisk - Police Safety 
The "danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers 
in addition to the driver in the stopped car." Maryland, 519 U.S. at 414. Furthermore, "[wjhere a 
police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes 
that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a 'frisk' or 'pat-down' 
search of the individual to discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Lafond, 68 
P.3d 1043,1049 (Utah App. 2003) (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis 
added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An officer's reasonable belief that an individual 
may be armed and dangerous is not necessarily assuaged by the Defendant's assurances. In State v. 
McLean, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that the officer "was not required to take the word of the 
driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening 
move before he checked the weapons to assure his own safety." Id., 1999 UT App. 114 ("not for 
official publication"). 
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Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives, testified that he recovered about 12 knives 
from the passengers, including a set of throwing knives. Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived 
to assist Officer Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of the Defendant. Before conducting 
the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed "quite a few," "more than five" knives that had been taken 
from the vehicle and that they "ranged [in size] from pocket knives to large knives." He also admitted 
that while there had been no overt threats from the passengers, he still had a concern for officer safety 
after observing the large number of knives. 
In addition, Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-13 knives from 
a vehicle. The sheer number of knives alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that 
there might be other weapons. Officer Robertson testified that he is always concerned about officer 
safety, though he personally had no fear at this scene for his own safety. Furthermore, the Court 
emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and there were a total of five occupants in the vehicle. 
In sum, the Terry frisk of the Defendant did not occur until after: 
a. The driver had been placed under arrest, 
b. 12-13 knives had been retrieved from the passengers and driver, including some large 
knives, 
c. A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to the trunk and the rear door of the 
vehicle. The Court also notes that the Defendant was a passenger in the rear seat at 
the time. 
In light of these facts, frankly, it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably 
believed that the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous. When the police 
initially approached the vehicle, they noted that one of the occupants in the back seat was armed with 
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a large knife. Additionally, when the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving on a 
suspended license, another knife was found on her. After the officers requested that the passengers 
turn over any other knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were recovered, including at least 
one from the Defendant. The Defendant argues that after these additional knives were "voluntarily" 
produced, the police no longer had a reasonable belief that the Defendant was armed or dangerous. 
However, this Court finds that such an argument fails to have any merit in the context of this traffic 
stop. As a result, the officers conducted a proper Terry frisk of the Defendant. 
IV. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
Signed this //~ day of February, 2005. 
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